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Between the Species
Just Meat:
Chicken-Pain, Intergenerational
Justice, and the American Diet

ABSTRACT
Peter Singer’s arguments against the morality of the typical American diet focus on the pain of animals, and lead to the conclusion
that we must become committed vegans. His approach ignores the
impact that different psychological capacities can legitimately have
on our moral appraisal of the interests of beings. Although we ought
to eat less meat because of the externalized environmental costs that
factory farming inflicts upon future people, an ideal diet may contain
some environmentally sustainably raised meat. Finally, the perception of ethical puritanism in committed vegans may be an obstacle to
achieving the real reductions in animal suffering that they advocate.
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Singer and Speciesism
Just one of the reasons we all ought to thank Peter Singer
is for his arguments popularizing the concept of “speciesism”
(Singer 1975, 22). For the great majority of the history of ethics, ethics has been anthropocentric. Except for Bentham and
Mill, all of the major ethical theories in the West have been
centered on asking questions about the relations of humans to
one another. Since humans were taken to be the only beings
capable of moral agency, they were posited as the only beings
deserving of moral consideration.
But Peter Singer attacks that presupposition. He argues that
granting moral considerability to all and only human beings is
speciesist and that it is wrong for the same reasons that racism
or sexism are wrong. The speciesist faces the same problem in
environmental ethics as the racist and sexist face in social ethics; the problem of arbitrary distinction. Each of these views
draws a boundary around a particular group of beings and
claims that the interests of those inside the boundary count for
more than the interests of those outside, but each fails to provide a principled reason for granting greater moral weight to
the interests of their preferred group. If one asks the speciesist
why all and only human beings deserve moral consideration,
he cannot say that it is because they are all moral agents; they
aren’t. A newborn human infant is not yet a moral agent. And
aged humans suffering from severe dementia, or humans who
have experienced higher-brain death but who are still, technically, alive are no longer moral agents. Such non-paradigmatic
humans (NPH’s) can also include humans who never were and
never will be moral agents, for example, infants born with
anencephaly who will die shortly after birth. So what is the
speciesist to say in attempting to justify his claim that all and
only human beings deserve moral consideration? He cannot
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point to intelligence or rationality as the criterion that morally
separates humans from nonhuman animals. Many human beings are less intelligent than a normal adult chimpanzee. When
it comes to such objections, all the speciesist has left to say is
that we deserve moral consideration just because we are human
beings. But here the arbitrary nature of the speciesist position
shows itself quite clearly. Racist and sexist views are wrong
because they attempt to justify the oppression of one group by
appealing to features that are irrelevant from a moral point of
view. Singer points out that speciesists are guilty of the same
error. He therefore wants to extend moral considerability to all
sentient creatures (all creatures capable of feeling pain). And I
agree with this claim (and would even extend it somewhat): all
beings with interests deserve to have their interests counted in
our moral deliberations.
But Singer believes that the recognition of the concept of
speciesism ought to lead us to accept the “Principle of Equal
Consideration of Interests” (PECI):
The interests of every being that has interests are to
be taken into account and treated equally with the like
interests of any other being…if a being suffers, there
can be no moral justification for refusing to take that
suffering into consideration, and indeed, to count it
equally with the like suffering (if rough comparisons
can be made) of any other being (Singer 1975; 5, 8).
Here I believe Singer goes too far. He argues that because
pain is pain whether it is human-pain or chicken-pain and pain
is always bad, we ought to consider the pain of chickens equally with the pain of persons in making our moral decisions. But
the PECI does not follow from the rejection of speciesism. Al-
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though the speciesist is irrational to assign differing degrees of
moral weight to the interests of beings based on species membership, which is morally irrelevant, it seems just as irrational to assign equal moral status to the interests of all sentient
beings, ignoring morally relevant differences in psychological
capacities between them. Singer allows that the PECI does not
imply that it is just as wrong to kill a normal adult chicken as
it is to kill a normal adult human being. He says that the interests that beings have in continuing to live will vary according
to the psychological capacities they have (Singer 1975, 19). So
he recognizes a difference in the value of the lives of beings
with different psychological capacities, but he refuses to grant
any distinction between the moral importance of the non-vital
interests of beings with differing psychological capacities.

Anthropocentrism vs. Logocentrism: Kant was
no Speciesist, but…
Speciesists assign moral weight to the fact that a particular
being is human. But there are good philosophical reasons for
us to distinguish between being human and being a person.
Logocentrists assign moral weight not to species membership,
but to the possession of psychological capacities, particularly
those marking off the class of “persons”. In the interests of
brevity, I must skip over an enormous amount of philosophical
work on the boundaries of the concept of personhood. Suffice
it to say that although I disagree with Michael Tooley’s claim
that infanticide is morally permissible, my own views roughly
follow his “self-consciousness requirement” (Tooley 1972, 62).
Hence, I will focus on two criteria that seem to offer us some
promise of drawing a coherent (if somewhat fuzzy) boundary
around the concept: potential rationality and self-consciousness.
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In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant tells us that every rational being exists as an end in
herself, and that in contrast to things, which have a price and
are to be used, rational beings (which he refers to as ‘persons’)
have dignity and ought to be treated with respect. Hence, we
get the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative: “So
act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that
of any other, in every case at the same time as an end, never
as a means only” (Kant 1785, 88). Now personally, I wish that
Kant had not used the word ‘humanity’ here, but in any case,
I think it is very clear from what Kant says elsewhere that he
meant to refer to the moral status established by a psychological capacity to guide one’s life according to the Moral Law (to
be a lawgiver unto oneself), rather than to biological membership in a species. That is, he meant to focus on personhood,
not on the particular natural bodies of human organisms. In
The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, Kant says, “The power
of proposing to ourselves an end is the characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from the brutes)” (Kant 1780, 27). This
capacity to set an end for oneself beyond the promptings of instinct or inclination is the characteristic that sets persons apart
for Kant, not membership in a biological species.
Finally, in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals,
Kant says:
…unless we deny that the notion of morality has any
truth or reference to any possible object, we must admit that its law must be valid, not merely for human
beings but for all rational beings as such…we must
not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of
this principle from the particular attributes of human
nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional ne-
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cessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational
beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all), and
for this reason only be also a law for all human wills
(Kant 1785; 68, 84).
Hence, for Kantians at least, there is a distinction to be
drawn between humans and persons; Kant was no speciesist.
But even though Kant did not assign moral weight to species
membership alone, he did ignore the psychological capacity for
sentience in assigning moral status to beings and to their interests. According to Kant, beings that are not persons are merely
things, entirely lacking in moral status in their own right. Other than his directives against animal cruelty (which are meant
to protect our own character, not any animal’s interests), (Kant
1780b, 240) Kant allows that every being that is not a person
may be used as a means only (Kant 1785, 87).
On one side of the moral divide, Kant grants the highest
moral status (indeed, infinite worth) to rational beings capable of guiding their lives according to the moral law. And on
the other side, zero moral status attaches to everything else
indiscriminately. Although I am in disagreement with much of
what Peter Singer says, here he has something to teach Kant:
sentience matters in terms of moral status. To conceive of dolphins, puppies, oysters, trees, and stones as equal in moral status is to ignore what are obviously important and morally relevant differences between these beings. Yes, full broad rationality (or the capacity for moral agency) counts morally, but so
do potential rationality, and self-consciousness, and sentience,
and, I would suggest, so does simply being a living being (or
having interests in the broadest sense). And even if we are
justified in assigning greater moral status to persons, it does
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not necessarily follow that we have to assign zero moral status
to all nonpersons. Just as Singer is wrong to ignore the moral
relevance of psychological capacities above sentience, so Kant
is wrong to ignore the moral relevance of psychological capacities below full broad rationality (his criterion for personhood).

Persons vs. Nonpersons: Fuzzy Boundaries,
Levels of Value, and Ambivalence
My own thinking about the concept of personhood leads me
to two conclusions. The first is that we are not able to provide
a precise set of necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood that is both precise enough to yield a determinate answer
about whether something is a person in every case, and in complete agreement with our fundamental moral intuitions (English 1975, 235). If we define rationality as the capacity to solve
complex conceptual problems and to guide one’s life according
to principle, and define self-consciousness as an awareness of
oneself as a continuing subject of experiences, the question of
just how much actual or potential capacity or awareness is required in order to be a person seems not to be answerable in a
way that is both precise and principled. The concept of a person is a family-resemblance concept, and our intuitions about
whether something is a person flow from a rough comparison
between paradigmatic examples of persons (e.g., adult competent human beings) and beings that lie nearer to the periphery,
or in the penumbra, of the concept. There may be some beings
that we can clearly say are persons (everyone reading this, for
example), some beings that we can clearly say are not persons
(a normal adult chicken), and some beings about which we are
not exactly sure what to say (normal adult chimpanzees, humans who have experienced significant higher brain injuries,
and other “near persons” (Varner 2012, 134)).
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The question of how much actual or potential rationality or
self-consciousness is required for personhood leads directly
into my second conclusion: that personhood stands at one pole
of a continuum of levels of both psychological capacity and
moral status. It’s not as if there is a bright line separating persons from non-persons and absolute moral status should be accorded to beings on one side and zero moral status should be
accorded to beings on the other. Rather, just as the psychological capacities that paradigmatically signal personhood can be
found in greater and lesser degrees, so our ascription of moral
value ought to admit of degrees as well. That is, even if there is
a threshold above which we should say that every being ought
to be treated as an end in herself, it does not follow that we
ought to simply ignore the interests of beings lying below such
a threshold. The continuum of levels of psychological capacities displayed by creatures in the natural world should track
alongside a continuum of levels of moral status that we ought to
attribute to them until they reach the threshold of personhood,
after which they ought to be accorded (the highest) equal moral
status.
Nearly every moral theorist admits that psychological capacities matter morally. For Singer, sentience confers greater
moral weight to the interests of mice over the interests of oysters or trees. For Kant, full broad rationality (or the capacity
for moral agency) confers greater moral weight to the interests
of persons over the interests of things. And other ethicists have
argued that we can assign greater moral weight to the interests
of potentially rational beings over the interests of being that are
not potentially rational (Stone 1987, 815), or to the interests of
self-conscious beings over the interests of non-self-conscious
beings (Tooley 1972, 62). I want to assert (following Degrazia
2008, 192) that there is a continuum of degrees of moral status

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 20, Issue 1

87
Stephen Scales

corresponding to the continuum of levels of psychological capacities that we observe in the natural world. And if one being
has greater moral status than a second being, a harm to the first
being matters more morally than a comparable harm to the second being. Hence, we are justified in according unequal levels
of consideration to both the vital and the non-vital interests of
beings with significantly different psychological capacities (up
to the threshold of personhood, above which everyone is morally equal). On this view, Chicken-pain is not morally equal to
the pain of persons reading this: Singer is ignoring morally relevant factors in weighing the moral importance of the non-vital
interests of different types of sentient beings. Whether my assertion of this “sliding scale” view of the moral status (and,
hence, the moral weight of the interests) of various nonpersons
should be accepted will depend on whether it can successfully
allow us to explain, predict, and reliably guide our considered
moral judgments about a multitude of cases. Although I find
that it tracks my own intuitions and can explain, for example,
why people are so upset about the shooting of a gorilla in the
Cincinnati Zoo, yet not very upset at all about eating a chicken
quesadilla for lunch, I leave it to the reader to decide whether it
accords with his/her own considered judgments.
Even if we are permitted to give greater moral weight to the
interests of persons, the sacrifice of the interests of nonpersons
ought not to be accomplished without what I want to call ‘ambivalence’. What I mean by this is that since some nonpersons
approach closer than others to the highest level on a scale of
psychological capacities, we ought to consider them as closer
to us in terms of moral status as well. Because we ought to do
so, our sacrifice of their interests should not be accomplished
lightly or cavalierly. It ought to be attended with an appreciation of the value being destroyed, not with regret but with
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a kind of recognition that one is being morally ‘pulled both
ways’, hence, ambivalence. Hence, this logocentric view does
allow nonspeciesists to give some greater weight to the interests of persons over those of nonpersons, provided we don’t
simply ignore the value that is being sacrificed. How, then, can
we sort out the relative weights that ought to attach to the interests of the beings that lie along the moral continuum?
First, we need to distinguish between various levels of interests that beings have. (VanDeVeer 1998, 116) Vital interests will be those necessary for the survival of the being. For
example, my interest in breathing is a vital interest. Serious
interests will be not absolutely vital, but not merely trivial. For
example, my interest in continuing my career, or in maintaining my love-relationships, or my lifestyle are serious interests.
Trivial interests will be those that are merely a matter of my
preferred tastes. For example, my interest in eating mint chocolate chip ice cream rather than vanilla will be a trivial interest.
Now, regarding conflicts between various interests, we might
lay out the following weighting principles: strong logocentrism
will say that the interests of persons always trump the interests
of nonpersons; moderate logocentrism will say that the vital interests of nonpersons cannot be trumped by the trivial interests
of persons, but only by their serious interests; weak logocentrism will say that the vital interests of nonpersons can only be
trumped by the vital interests of persons, and differential logocentrism will adopt the view that whether the trivial interests
of persons trump the vital interests of nonpersons depends on
the degree of difference between the psychological capacities
of the beings involved. All of these weighting principles would
allow for eating meat in some cases. Strong logocentrism allows for eating meat even if it only fulfills a person’s trivial
interest. Moderate logocentrism allows for eating meat only if
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it fulfills a person’s serious interest. Weak logocentrism allows
for eating meat only if it is required for a person’s survival.
And differential logocentrism may allow for eating mollusks,
shrimp, fish, and (perhaps) birds to fulfill trivial interests of
persons, but only allow for eating mammals to fulfill serious
interests of persons. Assuming that we are prepared to give
some greater moral weight to the interests of persons over nonpersons, which of these views should we adopt?
Some argue that strong logocentrism would allow for recreational puppy cooking (cooking live puppies in a microwave
just for the fun of seeing them squirm), and that it is therefore
unacceptable as a moral theory (VanDeVeer 1998, 112). I think
that there are other reasons why we would judge recreational
puppy-cooking to be wrong: it causes gratuitous and unnecessary suffering. And it displays something wrong with the
person who enjoys it (a character defect). We could judge it
to be wrong even if we would think it acceptable to humanely
kill and eat puppies for the (trivial) reason that they taste good.
Hence, although I would agree that any view that permitted
recreational puppy-cooking would thereby disqualify itself as
a viable moral theory, I’m not sure that the strong logocentrist
would have to permit it. Although any of these logocentric
positions may be acceptable, I believe that the differential version aligns best with our most fundamental considered moral
intuitions and judgments. Weak logocentrism seems to give
too much weight to the lives of many nonpersons, requiring, for
example, that we resist the urge to swat a mosquito even while
it is biting us, and that we forego a scientific experiment that
would kill one mouse even if it could save millions of people
from blindness. Differential logocentrism, on the other hand,
allows that we may sacrifice the basic interests of a normal
rabbit for the sake of scientific experiments that promise to
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uncover a cure for Alzheimer’s disease, yet prohibits recreational puppy cooking. It recognizes the moral relevance and
importance of both sentience and personhood. And it tracks
the continua (of psychological capacities and moral status) that
I discussed earlier.
Singer and others also suggest that, in order to avoid speciesism, we must always be willing to treat Non-Paradigmatic Humans (NPH’s) in the same ways that we treat nonhuman nonpersons (Singer 1975, 14-15; Nobis 2008, 8). Nobis claims that:
Animals seem to be due the respect due to, at least,
comparably-minded humans. Since this respect requires not raising and killing these humans for the
mere pleasures of eating them, rational consistency requires the same treatment for chickens, cows, pigs and
other animals who often have far richer mental lives
than many humans (Nobis 2008, 8).
I think Singer and Nobis go too far in these claims. There
may be other legitimate reasons (besides differences in psychological capacities) why we don’t treat all nonpersons equally.
For example, if a person loves a nonperson, or the nonperson
stands in a “social relationship” (Kittay 2005, 111) with persons
(e.g., being a member of a family), we have reason not to use
the nonperson for scientific experimentation. We may even be
justified in treating such nonpersons as if they were persons,
granting them a sort of “honorary personhood” (Cushing 2003,
564), both morally and even legally. This is true whether the
nonperson is human or not. There may be other moral reasons
(besides differences in the psychological capacities/moral status of two beings) why we might be justified in treating them
differently. For example, treating NPH’s in some ways that we
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find it acceptable to treat cognitively similar nonhumans might
(simply because of their similarity in physical appearance to
human persons) inure us to the possibility of treating persons
in those ways (thus harming our character).
If we do accept differential logocentrism, we next have to
ask: “What kind of interest is my interest in eating meat?”
Singer claims that it is absolutely trivial. He might ask, “What
difference does it really make to you whether you have a steak
or a salad for lunch today?” And when the question is put this
way, it does seem to be asking about a trivial preference. But
others see their interest in eating meat as more serious. They
say that eating meat is one of the things that make life valuable
for them. And they would insist that the question should not be
put in terms of my decision to have a steak or salad for lunch
today; rather we should ask, “What difference does it really
make to you if you become a strict vegan for the rest of your
life?” Here it becomes clear that there is a substantial change
in my lifestyle at stake (not just my lunch preference today). I
could survive without meat, just as I could survive without leisure time, or with only the minimum calories required to avoid
starvation. And it isn’t a big deal for me to do any of these
things for one day. If my boss tells me that I have to work on
the weekend and I’m forced to sacrifice my leisure time for a
couple of days, it isn’t a big deal. But if my boss tells me that
keeping my job will require that I work all of my waking hours
for the rest of my life, this would require the sacrifice of serious interests on my part. The question of whether my interest
in eating meat is a trivial or serious interest appears to have an
analogous structure: it seems like a small thing for a day, but
gets much more serious if we are required to sacrifice it over a
lifetime. Hence, if we adopt either weak or differential logocentrism, it seems that we have established some philosophi-
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cally defensible space for the ethical permissibility of eating
meat.
This does not, of course, mean that we have justified factory
farming. Indeed, even the staunchest philosophical proponent
of eating meat would never try to justify the treatment of many
animals on factory farms and in slaughterhouses. Such treatment could never be described as displaying ambivalence, or
as respecting the (lesser, but nonzero) inherent values that are
being destroyed. Hence, there are humanitarian reasons for
ending factory farming, even if we don’t have to stop eating
meat altogether. But let us look at another kind of argument
against the typical American diet: one based on intergenerational environmental justice.

Intergenerational Logocentrism and the Need
for a Political Movement to Eat Less Meat
It is virtually certain that there will be people who inhabit this planet after every currently living person is dead, and
that they will have roughly similar biological needs as we do.
And assuming that such beings will exist, I think it is clear
that we have current moral obligations toward them. Temporal distance does not lessen our responsibilities to persons any
more than spatial distance does. From a Rawlsian perspective,
intergenerational justice requires that we adopt environmental
policies based upon what we would choose from within an intergenerational Rawlsian Original Position, e.g., that each generation use up no more of the earth’s renewable resources than
can be replaced, and use up no more of the earth’s nonrenewable resources than it can find technological substitutes for. If
future people are to have a right to life, they must, by implication, have a right to a livable environment; I believe that eating
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a small amount of environmentally sustainably produced meat
does not violate this duty.
But the American diet is not environmentally sustainable.
First of all, it requires factory farming. The average American
consumes about 200 pounds of meat and fish per year, about
60 pounds above average annual consumption in the 1950s.
That requires the production and slaughter of about 100 million pigs, 100 million cows, and 9 billion chickens, annually.
Between 90 and 95% of these animals are raised on factory
farms. A typical non-factory farm allocates about 700 times as
much space per animal as a factory farm (without antibiotics or
hormones). Hence, we could not satisfy current U.S. demand
for meat without factory farming (Singer and Mason 2006, 21).
And factory farming is hugely environmentally destructive.
Indeed, as World Watch Magazine puts it,
As environmental science has advanced, it has become
apparent that the human appetite for animal flesh is
a driving force behind virtually every major category
of environmental damage now threatening the human
future – deforestation, erosion, fresh water scarcity, air
and water pollution, climate change, biodiversity loss,
social injustice, the destabilization of communities and
the spread of disease (Singer and Mason 2006, 240).
Jeremy Rifkin has documented some of the deforestation
that results from out appetite for meat, and that this deforestation is a leading cause of loss of biodiversity (Rifkin 1995,
445). Given present levels of deforestation in Latin America,
Asia and Africa, we can expect the loss of biodiversity to continue at a similar level (about 1000 times higher than the prehuman background rate) (De Vos et al. 2015, 9). The meat-rich
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American diet is even a greater cause of global warming than
our beloved automobiles (Walsh 2008).
Hence, we must eat less meat. The typical American diet is
destroying the world our descendants will inherit; we are violating our duties to future people by eating so much meat that
we are destroying the planet. It would seem ethically incumbent upon us to try to generate a political movement to reduce
the amount of meat in the American diet.

Ethical Puritanism and Political Consensus
In The Ethics of What we Eat, Peter Singer and Jim Mason
argue that we all ought to move toward a vegan lifestyle, eliminating animal products from our diets completely. Although
I am sympathetic to the idea that we should all consume less
animal products, I’m not convinced that the radical elimination
of animal products should be promoted as an ethical requirement. Although simple intergenerational justice requires that
we take steps to prevent the destruction of the planet, complete
abstention from the use of animal products is not (as some have
claimed) “the single most effective thing you can do to reduce
your carbon footprint.” (PETA 2012) Abstention from reproductive sex would be a far more effective measure, as it would
eliminate the consumption of all of my children and their descendants. And suicide would be the best thing we could do for
future people (eliminating not just the consumption of all of the
future people who could be produced by me and my descendants, but eliminating my own consumption entirely as well).
I think we all sincerely hope that our duties to the future don’t
require that we kill ourselves. But that is the sort of ethical
Puritanism that I think may be standing in the way of the kind
of political movement I am advocating. When vegetarians and
vegans point an accusing finger at the tiniest breach of their
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ethical convictions, they turn the rest of us off. For instance,
look at some of the rhetoric Singer uses in his work:
Our decision to cease [eating meat] may be difficult,
but it is no more difficult than it would have been for
a white Southerner to…free his slaves. If we do not
change our dietary habits, how can we censure those
slaveholders who would not change their own way of
living? (Singer 2011, 51)
The typical consumer’s mixture of ignorance, reluctance to find out the truth, and vague belief that nothing really bad could be allowed seems analogous to
the attitudes of “decent” Germans to the death camps.
(Singer 1998, 101)
Many people believe that eating some (environmentally sustainably raised) meat is not wrong. If we insist that what they
are doing is wrong because it causes chicken-pain, and we compare their level of evil to Nazis and slaveholders, what prospects
do we have for building a political consensus with such people?
Perhaps one to three percent of the U.S. population is vegetarian or vegan. Even if the ethical purists about meat were to
convince another three to nine million people that eating meat
is always wrong, they would thereby reduce the consumption
of meat in America by about one to three percent. But if 150
million people would be open to an argument that they ought to
eat less meat (and environmentally sustainably raised meat) in
order to protect the environment for future persons, and could
be convinced to reduce their meat consumption by 50%, we
could thereby reduce the consumption of meat in America by
about 25% (and simultaneously provide an incentive for more
humane and sustainable animal agriculture practices). If Sing-
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er and others continue to push the view that chicken-pain is
morally equivalent to the pain of persons, they will be unlikely
to achieve political consensus, and unlikely to achieve the reductions in animal suffering that could be achieved if we were
all to pull together in a political movement to eat less meat (and
environmentally sustainably produced meat) under the banner
of intergenerational responsibility. Thus, ethical puritanism
about meat may actually be harming the effort to reach a political consensus that could save the planet for future people.
As a consumer, I usually want to get the most nutritious,
best tasting, most convenient and cheapest food I can get. But
I am not simply a consumer. I am also a moral person. And
I recognize that my duties to the future require that we place
restrictions on ourselves (as producers and consumers). Our
ethical duties to the future require that we eat less meat and that
we place restrictions on its production, which ultimately mean
we have to pay more for it. Even if eating some (small) amount
of environmentally sustainably raised meat is ethically permissible, we ought not to be willing to destroy our descendants’
world for cheap hamburgers.
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